In the world of policy, sometimes, very sophisticated people make arguments that rely on a foundation of blatantly circular logic.
The West’s criticism of Israel’s policy on Iran – a policy that will need to be fundamentally reevaluated after Tehran’s unprecedented missile and drone attack on April 14 – is one such example.
On the one hand, many Westerners criticized Israel for assassinating the IRGC commander for Syria and Lebanon, Mohammed Reza Zahedi, on April 1.
Critics use logical fallacies
Yet these same critics urged Israel not to attack the Islamic Republic’s nuclear weapons program.
In the end, Israel somewhat heeded these critics, with Transportation Minister Miri Regev confirming an Israeli attack on Iran’s S-300 anti-aircraft missile system – as a warning to Iran of the damage Israel could have done, but nothing more than that.
And, it is far from clear that this move made Israel safe from future direct attacks from Iran.
Those who slammed Jerusalem for eliminating Zahedi from the board said he was too high ranking and the strike destabilized the region. They add that Israel itself was surprised at the intensity of Tehran’s anger and its first-ever direct attack on the Jewish state, as proof that the strike was unnecessarily aggressive.
These critics then urged Israel to not attack Iran back to avoid the conflict spiraling. Most importantly, to avoid regional war, they urged Israel not to touch Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Essentially, they are saying to sit back, and wait for the ayatollahs and their proxies to do their worst against Jerusalem; to always play defense.
However, Zahedi was not killed in a vacuum, which is the way most global media reported it – as if the conflict between Israel and Iran started with his unprovoked death on April 1.
Rather, he has been directing a relentless terror campaign against Israel for years, from both Syria and Lebanon.
Hezbollah in Lebanon has fired on Israel thousands of times with rockets and anti-tank missiles since October 7, while militias in Syria likely fired hundreds of times.
But, for around a decade before October 7, the IRGC, led by Qasem Soleimani or Zahedi, or both, rallied Hezbollah and Syrian militias to attack Israel, developing a massive buildup of rockets and militias on Israel’s borders to prepare for an invasion or multi-front war – much like the current one.
Israel has been trying to hold Iran, its proxies, and Zahedi at bay with thousands of its own strikes on attempts by Tehran to smuggle more advanced weapons to the border with Israel, either from the Lebanese or Syrian side.
Israel would have nothing against Iran at all if the ayatollahs ever just left the Jewish state alone. The two states are around 1,500 km. apart – there are no land disputes. And, if Iran simply stopped the threats to Israel, Jerusalem would not order strikes on any Iranian because it simply would not be its business to do so.
When Israel decided on the Zahedi strike, the goal was to send Iran a message: that its years of pressing Hezbollah, Syria, and Hamas in Gaza to attack and wear down Israel, would not go unanswered.
This is no land disupute
There are no land disputes between the countries – they are around 1500 kilometers apart.
And if Iran simply stopped trying to threaten Israel, Jerusalem would not order strikes on anyone Iranian because it would not be the Jewish state’s business.
When Israel decided to kill Zahedi it was to send Iran a message that its years of pressing Hezbollah, Syria, and Hamas in Gaza to attack and wear down Israel, would not be free.
Hamas, of its own volition, chose October 7 as the date of invasion, breaking an existing ceasefire at the time. It is pertinent to remember that it could not have done it without Iranian funding, planning, weapons, and training.
Israel, then, had plenty of reasons to remove Zahedi; killing him was far from unprovoked.
When Jerusalem decides in the future whether it is strategic to target Zahedi’s successor, or some other similarly very high-ranking IRGC official, it will not need to weigh whether it is worth the risk – it will have all the information it needs, the strike would not be in a vacuum.
Will Israel be more endangered by a backlash of another Iranian direct aerial attack to avenge the death of one of its top IRGC officials or will it be more endangered if it does nothing and allows the Islamic Republic to slowly attack it and surround it with more and more deadly weapons with impunity?
This is not a simple balancing act, but it is one Israel will need to weigh – as opposed to the simplistic formula of some Western critics, acting as if “restraint” by itself is a strategy that could keep Israel safe from Iran.
And for those advising Israel not to strike Iran’s nuclear program in response to the aerial attack – how do they think Jerusalem should have responded? What is an appropriate response? The attack could have killed thousands of Israelis, making the October 7 massacre look like a warm-up, and could also have eliminated Israel’s F-35 squadrons, hampering Israeli national offensive and defensive power for the next decade.
These critics don’t want Israel to attack the nuclear program, nor Iranian officials in Lebanon and Syria who are organizing terror campaigns against Jerusalem. Do they really think that the Islamic Republic won’t fire missiles, rockets, and drones at Israel again because the Jewish state showed it was magnanimous?
How far will a US guarantee to defend Israel from such an attack deter Iran from attacking, when the worst thing that could happen to Tehran is that its missiles will not get through and its “best” case scenario is killing thousands of Israelis?
Israel may have missed a unique opportunity to set back Iran’s nuclear program, which would have been legitimized as “retaliation” for Tehran’s massive attack. But the US and the West pressed against it, so Jerusalem found a middle ground that did not draw blood, essentially letting Iran off the hook without bloodying it too much.
From the US’s perspective, in the short term, maybe it saved Israel from itself: from rushing into an unnecessary intensified regional war.
The difference is that Israel needs to live in this region long after the US may lose focus or interest, and will eventually need to recalibrate how it can both prevent Iran’s proxies from raining down a “ring of fire” on it, as well as prevent Tehran from breaking out to a nuclear weapon, which could endanger Israel on an existential level.
Balancing the risks of retaliating is necessary, but constant restraint as a complete strategy for dealing with a hardened adversary like Iran would eventually be more dangerous than acting.
