Japan and China spark new arms race in Asia
Al-Ayyam, Bahrain, July 24
The forecast from the International Institute for Strategic Studies after last year, predicting that a new arms race in Asia would incite regional tensions, appears to be materializing. The report by Tom Karako and Masao Dahlgren in 2023 identified Japan and China as the primary contenders in this anticipated race, which centers on developing and producing unconventional weapons capable of countering hypersonic arms.
Recently, the Chinese newspaper China Morning Post reported a significant breakthrough: Chinese scientists have unveiled a radar capable of tracking missiles at speeds of Mach 20 with an accuracy rate of 99.7%. This advancement utilizes cutting-edge laser technologies and a novel algorithm that transmits information at the speed of light, processes complex microwave signals, and mitigates issues of false images and targets.
Concurrent developments are taking place in Japan, as detailed in a British newspaper, Naval News report. Starting in 2026, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces will begin deploying the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) supersonic glide missile, a defensive weapon intended for island protection, boasting speeds surpassing the sound barrier and a range of 900 kilometers, with potential extensions by 2030. The Japanese government has expedited the production of this missile in collaboration with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, one of its leading industrial firms.
This move is partly driven by the fact that Japan’s ally, the United States, has fallen somewhat behind China in defensive hypersonic missile technology due to various factors. While Washington has invested over $8 billion in offensive hypersonic missile development over the past two years, its investment in defensive anti-missile technology has been considerably lower. The US Department of Defense does not expect to begin producing defensive anti-missiles before 2034.
China’s aggressive fortification with advanced weaponry is undoubtedly rooted in Beijing’s expansionist policies and regional dominance ambitions. This drive aligns with the ruling Communist Party’s doctrine of establishing a Greater China, incorporating Taiwan and disputed islands in the South and East China Seas. Additionally, it is a strategic move to counteract US and allied efforts to contain its aspirations.
Due to its authoritarian political system, China faces no significant legislative or popular opposition to competing in the arms race and investing heavily in military projects. On the other hand, Japan, which has only recently started to reconsider its long-held pacifist stance, is under pressure due to regional instability, North Korean provocations, and alliances among its historical rivals.
While legal constraints – such as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which limits militarization to self-defense purposes – pose challenges, Japan is compelled to engage in this arms race to safeguard its security and sovereignty. There is also considerable popular opposition from local civil organizations regarding the expansion of military spending.
Both Tokyo and Beijing have been driven to enter this arms race in the field of non-conventional weapons to address the unique challenges posed by tracking hypersonic missiles. These missiles’ ability to perform evasive maneuvers and follow low-altitude paths necessitates sensors with exceptional capabilities. An integrated model combining vision, accuracy, sensitivity, and the required satellite infrastructure is crucial for successful interception of such threats.
The unfolding arms race in Asia is a complex and multifaceted issue rooted in deep-seated geopolitical rivalries and technological advancements. Both China and Japan are making significant strides in developing non-conventional weapon systems, responding to the evolving nature of military threats and regional dynamics. – Abdullah Al-Madani
Israel’s target bank in Lebanon
Okaz, Saudi Arabia, July 25
The Israeli state has long been characterized by actions rooted in violence and human rights violations, yet assassination remains a defining feature of its operational strategy. A clear illustration of this can be seen in Mossad’s pursuit and elimination of the masterminds behind the 1972 Munich Olympics attack, orchestrated by the Palestinian militant group Black September.
This organization, infamously responsible for the murder of international participants, including Israeli athletes, saw its key planners systematically tracked down and killed by Mossad operatives. Despite some individuals fleeing, disappearing, or hiding in European countries, Mossad’s relentless pursuit ensured their eventual elimination. Many of these assassinations were carried out discreetly, without Israel officially taking responsibility. It took years to locate some targets, but the determination to execute these missions never wavered.
In the wake of the events of October 7, Israel has been simultaneously pursuing two strategies: conducting military operations in Gaza and southern Lebanon to dismantle both civil and military infrastructures supporting Hamas and Hezbollah and utilizing intelligence to target and neutralize leaders at various levels within these organizations. Hezbollah, which has long prided itself on its robust security apparatus and staunch cadre loyalty, is facing a series of assassinations that challenge its internal cohesion.
The growing list of assassinated leaders indicates potential erosion of loyalty, internal disaffection, and even betrayal among key figures who possess sensitive security information. This ongoing assault has deteriorated the image of invincibility that Hezbollah has carefully crafted, subjecting the group to a position of vulnerability.
A pressing question emerges: how has Israel managed to infiltrate Hezbollah so thoroughly, executing daily operations with precision and minimal errors? Israel has even hinted at its capability to target Hassan Nasrallah himself. For nearly 10 months, Israeli operatives have relentlessly pursued Hezbollah leaders, attacking them in their homes, vehicles, and even when disguised on mules. This persistence highlights weaknesses within Hezbollah’s security administration and hints at internal unrest among its cadres, fatigued by decades of mobilization and empty rhetoric.
Hezbollah’s boast of resilience and follower loyalty has faltered under the pressure of a conflict defined by more than just guerrilla tactics. Israel’s strategy of neutralizing leaders and denying the group any operational initiative has forced many into a continuous state of flight. Property once considered safe – homes, vehicles, and farms – have become targets for Israeli drones and planes. Such precision attacks owe much to a sophisticated ground intelligence network composed of disillusioned former supporters who no longer subscribe to the party’s ideology.
Israel’s target bank has been years in the making, not a result of recent events alone. While Hezbollah leaders delivered public addresses and rallied supporters with fervent speeches, Israeli agents meticulously gathered intelligence, even in the most private spaces. What Hezbollah perceived as a 2006 victory was likely a strategic deception by Israel, which has now reached unprecedented levels of intelligence penetration.
The party’s failure is glaring, not only in protecting its members from consistent attacks but also in its inability to dismantle spy cells that could mitigate its growing disgrace. The current situation reveals an alarming disintegration of the security and operational efficacy once claimed by Hezbollah. The ongoing assassinations by Israeli forces underscore a deep-seated problem within the organization, reflecting both internal vulnerabilities and the formidable proficiency of Israel’s intelligence and military apparatus. –Mohammed Al-Saeed
Why did Hezbollah stop confronting the Israel Air Force
An-Nahar, Lebanon, July 25
Since June 10, Hezbollah has been unable to down a single Israeli drone in Lebanese airspace. Prior to this, the organization had announced the downing of a fifth Israeli drone and issued statements claiming to have forced the Israel Air Force to evacuate its fighter jets using surface-to-air missiles. Hezbollah’s propaganda machine embarked on an assertive campaign, declaring its intention to “liberate” Lebanese airspace with its advanced weaponry. But abruptly, this military and propagandistic confrontation ceased, with neither Hezbollah nor Israel offering any explanation. What transpired?
Over the past three weeks, the Israel Air Force initiated a campaign to intimidate the Lebanese populace by conducting mock raids across Lebanon. This plan, sanctioned by Israel’s political leadership, aimed to highlight the hefty price Lebanese civilians in otherwise “safe” parts of the country pay due to Hezbollah’s actions, thus stoking pressure on Hezbollah to halt border skirmishes and agree to ceasefire terms. Concurrently, Israel intensified its strategies to target and assassinate Hezbollah’s leaders and fighters using drones.
In contrast, rather than ramping up defenses against Israeli aircraft and drones, Hezbollah pivoted to an alternative tactic that appears not to trouble Israel “strategically,” expanding its attacks on vacated towns in northern Israel. In the interim, several key developments unfolded: Israel tracked missiles-launching fighters deep into the Bekaa Valley, struck warehouses allegedly belonging to Hezbollah’s air force, conducted a series of raids in Syria targeting Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards weapons caches, training sites, and supply routes, and eliminated intermediaries procuring high-quality arms for Hezbollah.
While there is no concrete evidence linking these actions to the cessation of Hezbollah’s confrontations with Israeli drones and aircraft, there is a plausible connection between these tactics and Israel regaining unfettered access to Lebanese airspace at no cost.
At present, it is evident that the Israeli army’s confidence in Hezbollah’s diminished capabilities is growing. The Maariv newspaper cited a senior Israeli military source who believes there’s a decline in Hezbollah’s operational capabilities at the command and control level, as well as in its ammunition stockpiles, which are reportedly difficult for Hezbollah to replenish, leaving some stocks depleted.
Historically, Lebanon’s public discourse was largely dictated by Hezbollah. Remarkably, the cessation of Hezbollah’s anti-aircraft activities, despite its significance, has been conspicuously absent from Israeli discourse, both military and media. If one were to indulge in conspiracy theories, it could be surmised that an arrangement was struck between Israel and Hezbollah: Hezbollah would cease targeting Israeli drones if Israel halted its raids on Baalbek and surrounding areas. Indeed, since Hezbollah stopped targeting Israeli drones, Israeli raids on Baalbek have ceased. Previously, Israel had established a tit-for-tat strategy of retaliating against Golan Heights attacks by striking Baalbek. While Hezbollah has not ceased its activities in the Golan, Israeli strikes on Baalbek have stopped.
What does this signify for future developments? In the media, the Israeli army suggests that Hezbollah’s “erosion” will facilitate what they call a “ground maneuver” inside Lebanon. However, given the broader context of exhaustion gripping both the Israeli state and its military, Israel may simply escalate the war of attrition while avoiding full-scale war.
Regardless of the precise reasons behind Hezbollah’s halt in confronting Israeli drones, it is evident that one of two realities is concealed: either Israel has found a “cure” for its woes through military pressure, or Hezbollah is amenable to compromises that ease Israeli concerns. In both scenarios, one overarching conclusion stands: neither exhausted party desires an all-out war, paving the way for mediators to ultimately achieve a diplomatic resolution when the opportunity arises. – Fares Khachan
Hezbollah plays up CNN interview
Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, July 25
One of the most significant and disheartening issues affecting those engrossed in the Arab-Israeli conflict is the deep-seated division within the Palestinian community itself, particularly between the two dominant factions, Fatah and Hamas. This rift persists regardless of one’s personal stance on Hamas, its strategies, and its ideological leanings.
Over the past several years, regional and international powers have made continuous efforts to broker reconciliation between these groups. Delegations from Palestine have convened in various world capitals, engaging in talks, presenting propositions, and capturing moments with souvenir photos. However, despite these diplomatic endeavors, the underlying discord remains, only surfacing visibly at the first sign of strain.
Most recently, Beijing announced its role as the latest mediator, aiming to facilitate Palestinian reconciliation. China recently reported an agreement reached by 14 Palestinian factions to establish an “interim national reconciliation government” to govern the Gaza Strip following the war. This announcement followed a meeting hosted by China, which culminated in the signing of a national unity agreement between Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian factions.
The split between Hamas and Fatah can be traced back to 2007, when Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip following violent confrontations with Fatah, which was subsequently expelled. Since then, there has been scant progress toward genuine reconciliation despite numerous attempts. Internal disputes, coupled with regional and international pressures as well as Israeli opposition, have created significant obstacles to the successful implementation of any new agreements.
Several sources have indicated that the primary contention among Palestinian parties revolves around governing Gaza post-war. This is hardly surprising given Hamas’s dominance in Gaza, which has exacerbated the current situation. Furthermore, international parties have shown interest in formulating a consensus among the factions to manage Gaza during this critical juncture, especially concerning reconstruction efforts, which will necessitate substantial contributions from both Palestinians and international donors.
Hence, it must be acknowledged that reconciliation involves more than just signed agreements; it is a protracted process that demands sincere commitment from all parties to achieve shared objectives. Although the Palestinian factions’ desire for national unity is encouraging, it requires practical assurances and effective implementation mechanisms.
Although Beijing may have succeeded in bringing the Palestinian factions to the negotiating table, the true measure of success lies in the parties’ dedication to executing the agreements and achieving lasting reconciliation. This development appears positive on paper, with Hamas leaders emphasizing national unity as the optimal solution to the current Palestinian plight. However, historical precedents compel us to question: will this endeavor finally bring about genuine reconciliation, or will it simply join the list of previous failed attempts? – Abdel Latif El-Menawy
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb
