In the aftermath of the Hamas October 7 attack, Iran was quick to mobilize all its proxies in the region to begin a combined attack on Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria. Hezbollah, for instance, quickly intervened but only with limited attacks, attacking Israel with rockets, small arms fire, mortars, and drones. The Houthis in Yemen also have joined the attack, targeting Eilat and then targeting shipping. In Iraq and Syria, the Iran-backed militias have attacked US forces more than 100 times.
Now, Iran may be settling into this conflict. Iran had sought over the last several years to “unify the arenas” against Israel, which meant being able to key in different groups around Israel to threaten Israel. Iran could rely on Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others.
The arrival of the Houthis on the battlefield is also an interesting phenomenon. The emerging threat from Yemen was known for years. The Houthis’ official slogan is “Death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews.” Previously, however, the group was busy fighting the Saudi-backed Yemen government. Now it can focus on Israel. It has based Iranian-style Shahed 136 drones in Yemen since 2021. Its attacks on ships are a new phenomenon.
However, for Iran the question must now be a clear crossroads. Either Iran can escalate, or it can seek to “manage” the conflict. There is a kind of irony in Iran’s seeking to turn the tables on Israel. Israel had been investing in managing the conflict in Gaza over the last decade, and Israel was focused on the broader Iranian threat in the region.
This was characterized as a “third circle” threat. Iran was far away, in a sense, from the immediate circle of threats. But the Iran threat was larger because of the nuclear program. Now Iran has tried to push its proxies, like so many pawns, closer to Israel. Iran now may seek to “manage” the conflict, and Israel will need to respond to how it keys in its various proxies.
Hezbollah, Hamas have suffered, but other proxies have not
Iran has already keyed most of them in, so the question for Tehran is what to do next. Hezbollah has lost more than 115 of its members since October 7. Hamas has lost thousands of its terrorist fighters. The Houthis are unscathed. The Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria are unscathed. Palestinian Islamic Jihad has suffered some losses, in the West Bank and in Gaza, but it was never a very large organization to begin with.
For Tehran, there are questions to be asked about their next phase. Iranian pro-regime media may reflect some of this thinking. They have toned down their coverage of Gaza. This could indicate a calm before the next storm. It could also indicate a very real decision to move away from too much coverage as Iran senses that it won’t get much more success in Gaza.
Tehran and Hamas may be suffering from diminishing returns. Iran will be asking itself who benefits from a war of attrition. I think that Hamas will benefit, the way Hezbollah benefited from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It thinks Hamas can benefit from a ceasefire and international pressure on Israel. Then, Hamas will leverage its claims of “winning” in Gaza to achieve influence in the West Bank and prepare for the next phase. Towards this end, the Iranian regime media accuses Israel of prolonging the conflict and not accepting a ceasefire.
The fact that Iran’s Fars News, which is close to the IRGC, had a main headline on December 21 about the president of Iran “solving problems, fixing the holes” would appear to mean Iran is focused a lot on domestic issues. It has distracted the region and the world by backing Hamas and creating war around the region. Now with the world distracted, Iran can focus domestically. Of course, that could be media reporting that is just for domestic consumption, while Iran prepares another surprise for the region. The only issue facing Tehran in this regard is that it has already tried to use its proxies to do their worst and they haven’t succeeded.
