Yoav Gallant appears to be just the first to go. Next on the line: the IDF Chief of Staff and the head of the Shin Bet. Netanyahu wants Israel’s security apparatus to be molded in his image, an extension of his office, with a cadre of compliant, obedient yes-men.
His recent actions show he’s unfit to lead, a sentiment echoed by many top officials who work closely with him—I’ve heard it firsthand from several of them. Some worry that the Shin Bet and the IDF could end up like the police, filled with loyalists indebted to the person who appointed them, promoting people unqualified for high office so they remain beholden to the Prime Minister. This strategy has worked before.
Israel’s Prime Minister dismissed the Defense Minister amid an ongoing war, just as an intense strike on Iran was being prepared (or so it’s been claimed). The aim was to keep the coalition together and preserve ultra-Orthodox exemptions from military service. There was no operational reason for Gallant’s dismissal—recent months have seen significant tactical and strategic successes. The only reason for Gallant’s removal was a political maneuver to secure ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions.
A day earlier, Gallant ordered the IDF to issue 7,000 additional draft notices to ultra-Orthodox men, acknowledging the urgent need for more soldiers. Netanyahu, however, is focused on his own need to keep the ultra-Orthodox in his coalition. In this clash between a national survival interest and Netanyahu’s personal survival, the latter has won—at our expense. Israel now has a Prime Minister who is, at best, a national security risk.
Gideon Sa’ar, who returned to Netanyahu, the very person who once attacked him with venom, bears some blame. I never thought he’d abandon his principles, yet here we are. Sa’ar, who once helped oust Netanyahu in 2021, now supports his political survival in 2024. Contrary to his explanations, Sa’ar didn’t join the coalition to “fight Iran,” “defeat Hezbollah,” or “take down Sinwar.” All that has been done without him. Sa’ar has abandoned his promises, sold out his voters and his soul, for a political maneuver to perpetuate ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions.
Gallant’s dismissal was planned, with timing chosen carefully: on the eve of US elections, while the public anxiously awaits an Iranian strike and thousands of reservists, some of whom protested in the streets, are being called up. It’s a time when the public is frightened, exhausted, and worried—an ideal moment to replace the Defense Minister in the midst of war. Even Machiavelli would be shocked.
The timing also serves to distract from the latest scandal involving the Prime Minister’s office. Instead of focusing on this security debacle, the headlines are now about Israel Katz and Gideon Sa’ar. This is how the agenda looks in a country that was once, relatively speaking, a stable democracy.
What Sa’ar said in previous election campaigns
In the last two election campaigns, Gideon Sa’ar often said, “If you want Netanyahu, don’t vote for me.” It turns out those who wanted Netanyahu should have voted for him. All of Sa’ar’s voters believed he would fight to replace Netanyahu and his government. So where is the toxic machinery now to label him a “traitor” and a “sellout,” as it did to the unfortunate Bennett?
On the night Gallant was fired before the war even began, Sa’ar tweeted, “Netanyahu’s decision to fire Gallant is madness that shows a complete lack of judgment. There is no precedent in Israel’s history for firing a Defense Minister because he warned, as required by his position, of a security threat. Netanyahu is determined to drive Israel into an abyss. Each additional day he remains in office endangers Israel and its future.”
Now, with Gallant’s dismissal happening amid war, imagine what Sa’ar would tweet if he hadn’t rejoined the man who “endangers Israel and its future.”
Netanyahu’s spokespersons tried to explain that while the draft notices might have been the last straw, there has been longstanding tension between Netanyahu and Sa’ar. But let’s consider: with which Defense Minister has Netanyahu not had disputes? Each of them—Isaac Mordechai, Ehud Barak, Moshe Ya’alon, Bennett, Lieberman—met the same fate.
This brings to mind the serious disagreement between Gallant and Netanyahu in this war. On October 11, four days after the massacre, Gallant, on behalf of the army, presented a plan for an immediate strike to kill Hassan Nasrallah and the Hezbollah leadership. The planes were airborne, and the intelligence was precise, but Netanyahu got cold feet and called it off (with the backing of Gantz and Eisenkot, who were urgently summoned).
The main issue between Gallant and Netanyahu was that Gallant tried to shield the military from Netanyahu’s influence. Gallant also maintained a strong strategic relationship with the Americans, a crucial but “irresponsible” move in Netanyahu’s eyes. In other words, Gallant refused to be part of Netanyahu’s toxic machinery, choosing to prioritize Israel’s security—and for that, he was dismissed.
Meanwhile, two major investigations by the Shin Bet and police are underway concerning Netanyahu’s office. The first investigates leaks of highly classified materials from Military Intelligence to individuals in Netanyahu’s circle, allegedly to sway public opinion, which has resulted in ongoing damage to intelligence sources, human lives, and hostage recovery efforts, according to sources close to the investigation.
The second investigation, now cleared for publication, focuses on attempts to remove, alter, or erase sensitive protocols and documents related to the war. Maj.-Gen. Avi Gil, the former military secretary to Netanyahu, reportedly filed a complaint on this issue to the Attorney-General. Around that time, I heard reports that Netanyahu’s team, allegedly following instructions from his wife, swept through archives, binders, and protocols, gathering and organizing materials. There’s a chance these two investigations will converge in a way that serves Israel’s best interests.
