Since the Abraham Accords were signed in Washington by Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and later by Sudan and Morocco, talk has run wild about a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia.
But, though the Israeli prime minister at the helm remains the same the people that close normalization deals have slightly shifted, and so have some tensions between them.
Though there is no official talk of a deal, here is an explanation of why, in terms of the Israeli team, it might work better in 2024 than it did in 2020, sources have told The Jerusalem Post.
Strategic Affairs Minister (and long-time personal confidante of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) Ron Dermer is publicly running the US track of the negotiations, which, if they get to the point of documents and wording, will continue to lead that side of things.
There are few Israelis who can match Dermer’s familiarity with the complexities of American politics and the ability to rally support in Washington, while also being trusted by Netanyahu.
The Mossad maintains respect
On the flip side, Mossad Director David Barnea played a key role in maintaining the respect for and the desire and vision for a deal, both in Riyadh and in Washington.
Barnea has, numerous times, “held the hand” of foreign officials to keep the larger reasons to sign a deal in sight: common national interests, especially following provocative moves and statements by some coalition members, in Israel’s most far-right government.
The year 2023 contained most of those tensions, particularly over a rise in violence in the West Bank, and especially after October 7.
In May 2022, it was revealed that Mossad chiefs, like Yossi Cohen and Tamir Pardo, met with Saudi Arabia’s rulers.National Security Council Chief Tzachi Hanegbi is also coordinating and is in the loop with Netanyahu, even if he may not have as large a leading role as Dermer and Barnea. In addition, the Foreign Ministry holds a key role on certain issues.
Some of the differences between the Mossad officials and Netanyahu’s advisers relate to the idea of “surfacing.” Surfacing relations into the public sphere is, at its core, a public event, something that is usually supposed to be anathema to the Mossad, which operates in the shadows.
The Mossad is known for meeting under the radar with all kinds of Arab leaders with whom Israel has no official relations years before things come out into the open.
Together, these officials hope that pressure from the Saudis to reach a deal will be ratified by the Senate before the US presidential election in November. They hope that these factors – the pressure and the shared interests – will be enough to bring about a deal.
Though former US president Donald Trump helped solidify the 2020 Abraham Accords and would doubtlessly be enthusiastic about doing it with the Saudis, should he return to the White House, he may be less able than Biden to rally a bipartisan two-thirds vote in the Senate.
Biden, in contrast to Trump
Under Biden, the Democrats would likely support such a deal to buttress his reelection bid, while Republicans would support such a deal as a matter of ideology and credit.
It is also possible that no Democrat would vote for a deal put forward by a Trump administration for a few reasons: Greater enmity toward Trump, less of a political gain for their candidate, general sentiments about promoting Saudi ties and giving Israel a win without a final deal with the Palestinians.
Of course, a deal is still a long shot before elections due to the war in Gaza.
The bottom line remains that in the constellation of officials, all with very different portfolios, some clandestine and some public, there exists less tension over who gets credit than there was in 2020.
The Abraham Accords changed the region forever – regardless of how they were achieved and who did what.
Numerous sources have confirmed though that there was serious tension between Cohen, then national security council chief Meir Ben Shabbat, and Ben Shabbat’s lead normalization planner, Ronen Levy.
The sides fought openly and repeatedly about control over the Morocco and Sudan tracks. Netanyahu had to intervene.
There were also a few more low-key tensions from Cohen being left out of the loop in the final negotiating rounds, which were handled by Dermer (then ambassador to the US) leading up to September 2020, after Cohen and his predecessors clandestinely laid much of the groundwork for the deal within the region itself.
In fact, in Netanyahu’s 2022 autobiography Bibi, despite acknowledging Cohen and the agency’s role in many aspects of the accords, he implies that they were left out of the loop in the final sprint with the UAE. This has been confirmed by numerous other sources to the Post, though Cohen himself has declined to comment.
According to Netanyahu, only three Israeli officials on the planet besides him knew about the final negotiations in Washington that summer, leading to the breakthrough signing.
He mentioned Dermer, Ben Shabbat, and close confidante and current Justice Minister Yariv Levin, notably leaving out Cohen and the Mossad.
Netanyahu has never said why he kept the Mossad out of the loop in that last round, but sources have speculated that it might be harder for some security officials to keep secrets about diplomacy, especially when it is about to go public. In contrast, officials whose most crucial role is being close to Netanyahu’s advisers may be less likely to leak diplomatic secrets.
So, if there is a deal with the Saudis, Barnea could be more involved down the stretch. He and Cohen are different personalities. Cohen is likely on the verge of seeking public office, and some even openly talk about him as the future head of the Likud Party.
Cohen has been credited with massively successful operations against Iran and for making substantial contributions to the Abraham Accords right up to the summer of 2020.
In contrast, Barnea knows how to command his troops but does not seek the spotlight to the same extent as Cohen, which might keep him in the “know,” not just to line up a potential deal, but even on the final sprint, when Dermer might seal the deal.
