Abu Hassan al-Hamwi, chief commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Shams (HTS)’s military forces, revealed how the group was able to topple the Assad regime in just 11 days to the Guardian on Friday.
Hamwi explained the inward changes that HTS made as well as the changes directed to the wider organization of rebel forces.
Following Assad’s offensive against rebel forces in northwest Syria in 2019, HTS began developing a new military doctrine to transform the disparate, disorganized jihadist fighters into a disciplined military force capable of taking on the Syrian army.
Following the 2019 offensive, “all revolutionary factions realized the critical danger – the fundamental problem was the absence of unified leadership and control over the battle,” al-Hamwi told the Guardian.
Part of this involved extending consolidation offers to other rebel groups and defeating groups that refused to unify, such as the Al Qaeda affiliate Hurras al-Din.
A new military doctrine
Hamwi explained that the next challenge was developing a new military doctrine to combat Assad’s forces. Fighters were reorganized into standardized and coherent military units with an established chain of command.
HTS also began producing its own arms, vehicles, and ammunition.
In order to counter the Assad regime’s air superiority, HTS created a dedicated drone unit designed to develop and deploy modern drones to be used in combat.
This program was prosperous; notably, the “Shahin” suicide drone was used to full effect against Assad’s troops during the offensive.
After unifying northern rebel forces, HTS reached out to southern rebels, most of whom were in hibernation or exile after the Assad regime retook southern Syria in 2018.
HTS established a unified operations room, which brought together around 25 different groups to coordinate their actions against Assad.
The plan was for northern fighters to launch their offensive, followed by a southern uprising culminating in an encirclement of Damascus, with rebel forces meeting in the middle.
Hamwi explained that in late November, a regional situation assessment led to the decision to launch the operation.
The group wanted to prevent further renormalization of the Assad regime, as had happened in May when Saudi Arabia and the UAE recognized the Assad government.
Assad’s allies preoccupied
HTS also recognized that Assad’s international allies were completely preoccupied with their own conflicts. Russia was tied down in Ukraine and unable to spare aerial units to help prevent the collapse of the regime.
The same was true for Hezbollah, which had just been devasted by Israeli operations against them throughout Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah’s fighters were key in maintaining the rule of the Assad regime.
Iran was also preoccupied with combating Israel and was unable to send forces to support Assad.
Rebels launched their offensive on November 27, the day the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire went into effect that morning. Over the course of three days from November 29, the whole of Aleppo fell to rebel forces.
This led to a rapid fall of Assad’s control over Hama and then Homs, leaving the road to Damascus wide open.
Southern rebels launched their uprising on December 6, ahead of schedule, Hamwi told the Guardian. These uprisings quickly collapsed any semblance of Assad’s control over the south. By December 8, rebels had taken over Damascus, and Assad had fled the country.
Following their swift victory, HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani appointed HTS member Mohammad al-Bashir as transitional Prime Minister on December 10, and tasked him with forming a government.
