For an entire year, the IDF has been relentlessly targeting Hamas and other factions in the Gaza Strip, and the effort is bearing fruit. Even before the elimination of Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s military wing was a broken and dismantled entity, no longer capable of carrying out large-scale raids or fighting as a unified body with a central command and clear hierarchy.
However, Hamas is not just a fighting force; it is also an authoritarian ruling movement governing two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. After a year of fighting, it is time to assess its governance—and here, we find a surprise.
It turns out that most Hamas government offices are still functioning, and in many cases, they continue to provide services to civilians. Though they have been impacted—their budgets reduced, their workforce diminished, and some buildings destroyed—they remain operational. For example, the health ministry is functioning in emergency mode but still delivers essential services.
Large municipalities, like Gaza City, Jabalya, and Deir al-Balah, are clearing rubble from main roads, collecting trash, and, when necessary, handling the bodies of the deceased. This activity has prevented the widespread outbreaks of disease that many predicted during the early months of the war.
On the streets, government workers can still be seen: Palestinian Red Crescent officials, municipal workers, representatives of local committees maintaining order, and clinic and hospital staff. While their presence is diminished compared to the past, it reassures the public that the government is still alive and kicking. Hamas police also remain active, primarily focusing on maintaining order and assisting residents with food distribution.
The interior ministry has established a special unit called “The Arrow” to deal with crimes that have arisen due to the war. Thieves and looters often face the heavy hand of Hamas law. This doesn’t stop Hamas itself from taking goods or money that isn’t theirs, but that’s another story.
About six months ago, Hamas operatives, in a well-planned operation, raided several branches of the “Bank of Palestine.” One by one, they emptied the cash stored in the vaults, collecting more than 400 million shekels. This haul gave Hamas financial breathing room, but they have other income sources as well.
They impose relatively high taxes on merchants and often raid humanitarian aid convoys, taking a share of the deliveries. Cigarettes, for instance, have become a rare commodity in Gaza these days. Hamas sells them at exorbitant prices, raking in profits. Criminal organizations in the strip do the same. As a result, Israel has decided to ban cigarette imports to prevent Hamas from profiting.
Cigarettes now enter Gaza in limited quantities and in secret, primarily through aid convoys, and are sold on the black market. Over the past year, the IDF has uncovered cigarette shipments hidden inside watermelon deliveries, tobacco concealed in hollowed-out eggs, and sacks of flour smuggled in convoys.
It’s no wonder that a pack of cigarettes has risen to 300 shekels, with a single cigarette sometimes selling for 70 shekels. A Gazan acquaintance complained to me this week about the IDF’s cigarette import ban, saying, “They’re punishing us, the citizens, not Hamas.”
The collapsed plan
Due to this, combined with temporary restrictions Israel places on aid deliveries—often for various reasons—prices have soared to an unsustainable level. A kilo of rice, for example, can reach 50 or even 80 shekels. A kilo of potatoes sells for 100 shekels, and tomatoes for the same price. A pack of diapers costs 200 shekels. Meat and chicken are hard to come by, and when they are available, their prices are astronomical.
These prices are beyond what residents can afford. The vast majority of Gaza’s population, both in the north and south, rely on foreign aid. Aid comes through three main channels. One comes from Jordan, with deliveries entering through the Erez Crossing, where they are collected by the international organization World Central Kitchen and distributed to residents of northern Gaza.
A second route comes from Egypt, with trucks entering through the Kerem Shalom crossing and the supplies handed over to the Palestinian Red Crescent for southern Gaza residents. The third channel of aid arrives through Ashdod Port and is then sent to the Erez or Kerem Shalom Crossings. Numerous entities, including Arab countries, Western nations, and international organizations, send aid to Gaza.
A few months ago, there was a serious challenge to Hamas’ hegemony, but they managed to thwart it. Israel, through a plan devised by the IDF, attempted to establish relations with leaders of large Gazan clans to create a network of civilian opposition to Hamas. Threats to the lives of some of these leaders, along with unmistakable messages from Hamas, kept these influential figures close to Hamas and far from any joint ventures with Israel.
The collapse of the “Islands Plan,” as it was called by the IDF, came as no surprise. It was clear Hamas would act in this way. The surprise was that for months, political figures in Jerusalem and senior IDF officers believed it would be possible to establish pockets of loyalty in Gaza in a relatively short period.
Adding to this complex situation is the role of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in maintaining the delicate fabric of life in Gaza. PA President Mahmoud Abbas still pays salaries to 23,000 Fatah members, as he has done since Hamas’ military coup in 2007. These salaries are modest (averaging 1,600 shekels per person), and Hamas takes a cut, but they provide a safety net for tens of thousands of families.
While Abbas’ authority is more fragile than ever, a year after the massacre in Israeli border communities, Hamas remains the dominant force in Gaza when it comes to the civilian population. This fact alone prevents a total collapse of daily life and helps preserve some degree of law and order. Militarily, Hamas is not finished yet, either. In the northern part of the strip alone, where the IDF is currently re-operating Jabalya, Hamas is estimated to still have around 4,000 fighters. In the south, they still number in the thousands as well.
Is ISIS waiting for the signal?
Many Israelis would like to see this thin veneer of Hamas’s civilian governance torn apart for good. But actions must be carefully considered. Just like Sinwar and the hostages, the remnants of Hamas’s governance in Gaza are a double-edged sword: Sinwar was the enemy and thus the problem, but he also held the solution. Without him, we may lose the remaining hostages, making his elimination a gamble on their lives.
The same goes for dismantling Hamas’ civilian administration. It might provide satisfaction to many and bring justice to Hamas leaders for their crimes, but the absence of a governing authority, however weakened, is a recipe for anarchy.
Out of that chaos will emerge crime, followed swiftly by terror. The war has left thousands of families in Gaza devastated, and many—Hamas-affiliated or not—hold grievances against Israel. On the other hand, our enemies in the region—Iran, ISIS, and various jihadist groups—are waiting for the day when they can sink their claws into Gaza’s battered population and use them for their purposes.
Now, with Sinwar gone, everything is open again. Israel must decide whether it seeks a deal. Even in such a deal, Sinwar’s successors will push for concessions from us. Amid the maze of decisions ahead, Israel will also need to form a clear stance regarding the future of Hamas’s civilian wing.
